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IN the literature on African ethics, one finds relatively little that consists ofnormative theorization with regard to right action, that is, the articulation and
justification of a comprehensive, basic norm that is intended to account for what
all permissible acts have in common as distinct from impermissible ones.1
By “African ethics” I mean values associated with the largely black and
Bantu-speaking peoples residing in the sub-Saharan part of the continent, thereby
excluding Islamic Arabs in North Africa and white Afrikaners in South Africa,
among others. The field lacks a well-defended general principle grounding
particular duties that is informed by such values and that could be compared to
dominant Western theories such as Hobbesian egoism or Kantian respect for
persons. In this article, I aim to help develop such a principle.2
Some have approximated this project on occasion, but no one has made it a
primary aim that has been pursued in a systematic, analytic way.3 Furthermore,
*For written comments on an earlier draft, I thank Robert Goodin, Stephen Kershnar, Dirk Louw,
David Martens, Thomas Pogge, Augustine Shutte, Raymond Suttner and three anonymous referees
for The Journal of Political Philosophy. In addition, for oral comments, I am grateful to participants
at: the Conference on African Philosophy in the 21st Century held at the University of South Africa;
the Annual Conference of the Philosophical Society of Southern Africa held at Rhodes University; the
Ethics and Africa Conference held at the University of Cape Town; and a colloquium sponsored by
the University of KwaZulu-Natal Philosophy Department. I am also indebted to students in ethics
classes that I have instructed in the philosophy departments of the University of Johannesburg and the
University of the Witwatersrand. Finally, I am appreciative that some of this work was supported by
a Research Promotion Grant from the University of the Witwatersrand Faculty of Humanities
Research Committee.
1One more often finds something closer to moral anthropology or cultural studies, i.e., discussion
recounting the ethical practices or norms of a certain African people. For representative examples,
see Anthony Kirk-Greene, “‘Mutumin Kirki’: the concept of the good man in Hausa,” African
Philosophy: An Anthology, ed. Emmanuel Chukwudi Eze (Oxford: Blackwell, 1998), pp. 121–9; and
John Ayotunde Isola Bewaji, “Ethics and morality in Yoruba culture,” A Companion to African
Philosophy, ed. Kwasi Wiredu (Oxford: Blackwell, 2004), pp. 396–403. I do not mean to disparage
these discussions; I aim merely to distinguish them from this one.
2I focus exclusively on right action and set aside issues of good character (e.g., motives, virtues),
saving them for another occasion.
3Others reject this article’s aim outright, maintaining either that there is nothing about African
morality that significantly differs from Western morality, or that, while there are important
differences, African morality cannot be codified and is to be known merely on a “know it when I see
it” basis. For the former criticism, see Mamphela Ramphele cited in Penny Enslin and Kai
Horsthemke, “Can ubuntu provide a model for citizenship education in African democracies?”
Comparative Education, 40 (2004), 545–58 at p. 548, and for the latter, see Yvonne Mokgoro,
“Ubuntu and the law in South Africa,” Potchefstroom Electronic Law Journal, 1 (1998), 1–11 at
p. 2. My article as a whole, if successful, refutes both objections.
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the attempts so far, in my judgment, err in one of two major ways. They either
advocate principles that clearly cannot capture core aspects of African values and
hence are “tooWestern,” on the one hand, or they suggest principles that promise
to do so but cannot as they stand since they are too vague or limited, on the other.
My goal is to present an ethical principle that not only grows out of African soil
and differs from what is widespread in the West, but also is specific and
complete—or that at least has more of these qualities than what one currently
finds in the literature.
I begin by clarifying the nature of my project in more detail (section I). I
explain that I seek a theory of rightness that rationally reconstructs primarily
those values associated with talk of “ubuntu” and cognate terms that are
prevalent among sub-Saharan Africans. I also present criteria by which to judge
whether a theory of right action grounded on ubuntu is acceptable. I evaluate a
theory by the extent to which it accounts for two classes of particular moral
judgments, those that are deemed uncontroversial to more or less the same
degree by both Africans and Westerners, and those that tend to be deemed
uncontroversial more by Africans than by Westerners. In the following section, I
distinguish between six distinct theories that are found in, or suggested by, the
literature on African ethics, and I contend that one promises to account for all
these commonsensical intuitions much better than the others (section II). Then, I
refine the theory in a crucial respect so that it is more precise and complete
(section III). I conclude the paper by noting several ways in which the theory still
needs to be developed in future work (section IV).
I. CLARIFICATION OF THE PROJECT
In seeking to construct an African theory of right action, my aim is to develop
a principle that sub-Saharan Africans ought to believe, given adherence to
claims they typically deem to be less controversial than it. Hence, this largely
epistemic project is neither simply moral anthropology nor even
straightforwardly normative ethics. First, it is not merely descriptive, for I am
not just recounting what sub-Saharan Africans, or a majority of them, happen
to believe about rightness. I go beyond moral anthropology in that I seek to
unify variegated commonsensical beliefs and to argue that one such unification
(which may not be widely held) is better than others. Second, this project is
also not plainly prescriptive, for I do not assert that the favoured theory is in
fact true, in other words, that people should indeed conform to it. I argue that
there is strong epistemic reason to hold it, in relation to certain moral
intuitions common to sub-Saharan Africa and in comparison to other
theoretical expressions of African morality. I do not claim that the theory is
more justified than any non-African conception of morality, let alone that it
corresponds to the moral facts. My goal is to present a fundamental and
general principle prescribing right actions that is epistemically justified relative
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to the circumscribed set of African competitors and that could in future work
be paired up against Western moral theories.
To obtain focus in the search for an attractive African normative principle, I
address the (English-speaking) literature that comes closest to my project. Most
of this literature analyzes the values associated with the term “ubuntu” and
related terms in sub-Saharan Africa and draws out their practical implications for
political power, workplace organization and the like. “Ubuntu” is a word used
by the Zulu people of South Africa,4 and is difficult to translate into English
because it has many different connotations associated with it.5 Roughly, it means
humanness, and it often figures into the maxim that “a person is a person through
other persons.” This maxim has descriptive senses to the effect that one’s identity
as a human being causally and even metaphysically depends on a community. It
also has prescriptive senses to the effect that one ought to be a mensch, in other
words, morally should support the community in certain ways. Desmond Tutu,
the Nobel Peace Prize winner renowned for supervising the South African Truth
and Reconciliation Committee (TRC), provides a rough gloss of the normative
connotations of “ubuntu”:
When we want to give high praise to someone we say, “Yu, u nobuntu”; “Hey,
so-and-so has ubuntu.” Then you are generous, you are hospitable, you are friendly
and caring and compassionate. You share what you have. It is to say, “My humanity
is caught up, is inextricably bound up in yours.”6
In this article, I critically discuss the ways that the literature construes ubuntu as
grounding a normative ethical theory of right action (or at least brings to mind
such a construal), analytically setting aside ubuntu as a comprehensive worldview
or a description of a way of life as a whole.
To give the reader more of a sense of what the morality of ubuntu involves, and
to present some criteria for an adequate moral theory, I here review some
intuitions that most friends of ubuntu firmly hold. More specifically, it will be
revealing to distinguish between two groups of such intuitions, those held by
Westerners and Africans to roughly the same extent, and those more often held
by Africans than by Westerners. I seek a theory inspired by ubuntu that best
accounts for both groups of intuitions.
4There are cognate terms and ideas associated with them in at least all the other Bantu languages
of sub-Saharan Africa, e.g., “Nunhu” in Shona (Zimbabwe) and “Utu” in Swahili (Kenya), on which
see Johann Broodryk, Ubuntu: Life Lessons from Africa (Pretoria: Ubuntu School of Philosophy,
2002), p. 14.
5For discussion of the etymology of “ubuntu,” see Mogobe Ramose, African Philosophy Through
Ubuntu (Harare: Mond Books, 1999), pp. 49–53, and Mogobe Ramose, “The ethics of Ubuntu,”
Philosophy from Africa, 2nd edn, ed. P. H. Coetzee and A. P. J. Roux (Oxford: Oxford University
Press, 2003), pp. 324–30 at pp. 324–28.
6Desmond Tutu, No Future Without Forgiveness (New York: Random House, 1999), p. 31.
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First, consider moral judgments that are commonly accepted by both
adherents of ubuntu andWestern people in modern, industrialized, constitutional
democracies. For both groups, it is by and large uncontroversially pro tanto
immoral:
A. to kill innocent people for money.
B. to have sex with someone without her consent.
C. to deceive people, at least when not done in self- or other-defence.
D. to steal (that is, to take from their rightful owner) unnecessary goods.
E. to violate trust, for example, break a promise, for marginal personal gain.
F. to discriminate on a racial basis when allocating opportunities.
I take it these judgments are self-explanatory, needing no elaboration.
Before sketching the intuitions that I maintain Africans hold more often than
Westerners, I warn the reader that I do not mean to suggest that all sub-Saharan
societies, let alone all individuals in them, hold them. What I claim are moral
judgments more common among Africans than Westerners are values that are
more widespread in the sub-Saharan part of the continent than in Europe, North
America or Australasia. They are values that are more often found across not
only a certain wide array of space, from Ghana to South Africa, but also a long
span of time in that space, from traditional societies to contemporary African
intellectuals. They are also values that recur more often in the literature on
African ethics than in that on Western ethics. So I am speaking of tendencies, not
essences. If I am to develop a moral theory that has an African pedigree and
differs from what one standardly finds in Anglo-American and Continental
philosophy, then it will be important to find a principle that entails and well
explains these kinds of intuitions. Because they might be less familiar to the
Western reader, I provide a brief explanation of them. More often for Africans
than for Westerners, then, it is uncontroversially pro tanto immoral:
G. to make policy decisions in the face of dissent, as opposed to seeking
consensus.
In the political realm, unanimity is prized, and majoritarianism is typically
seen as a morally inadequate way to resolve conflicts of interest or to determine
law. In many small-scale African communities, discussion continues until a
compromise is found and all in the discussion agree with the outcome.7 Some
contemporary African philosophers have sought to extend consensus-based
decision-making to a modern, urban setting, proposing fascinating and
under-explored models of representative democracy quite different from the
winner-take-all system in the United States and the parliamentary systems in
7For an anthropological overview of traditional African politics and the role of consensus in it, see
the classic text, Meyer Fortes and Edward Evans-Pritchard, eds, African Political Systems (London:
Kegan Paul, 1994, originally published 1940).
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Europe. For instance, drawing on the consensual politics of the Akan people in
Ghana, Kwasi Wiredu advocates a “non-party polity,” a type of democratic
system in which a candidate who wins a majority of votes would not represent a
party once in office, but would instead represent the public as a whole. That is,
a representative who has been elected would not aim to promote his
constituency’s interests, but would rather share power with other representatives
by seeking consensus with them in the adoption of every government policy.8
H. to make retribution a fundamental and central aim of criminal justice, as
opposed to seeking reconciliation.
By “retribution” I mean any consideration that could be invoked to justify
punishing a law-breaker fundamentally for, and in proportion to, wrongdoing.
For example, one retributive reason to punish an offender could be the bare
fact that he justly deserves condemnation because of, and to the same degree
as, his having done wrong in the past. In contrast to such a backward-looking
rationale for punishment, many African communities believe it appropriate to
respond to crime with the expectation of a good result of some sort, whether
to appease angry ancestors and thereby protect the community from their
wrath, or to mend a broken relationship between the offender, his victim and
the community.9 For two examples from South Africa, an ubuntu ethic is
usually credited for helping to ground a restorative, rather than punitive,
response to apartheid-era political crimes in the form of the TRC,10 and the
justices of the South African Constitutional Court have uniformly judged
ubuntu to be incompatible with the death penalty or any retributive reasoning
that could underwrite it.11
I. to create wealth largely on a competitive basis, as opposed to a cooperative
one.
In many traditional African societies land is ultimately owned in common and
it is held that labour should be undertaken for the sake of the community, neither
8See Kwasi Wiredu, Cultural Universals and Particulars: An African Perspective (Bloomington:
Indiana University Press, 1996), pt. 4. See also Ramose, African Philosophy Through Ubuntu,
pp. 135–53.
9“Law . . . directs how individuals and communities should behave towards each other. Its whole
object is to maintain an equilibrium, and the penalties of African law are directed, not against specific
infractions, but to the restoration of this equilibrium”; J. H. Driberg, “The African conception of
law,” Journal of Comparative Legislation and International Law 16 (1934), 230–45 at p. 231. For
a concrete example among the Akan in Ghana, see Kwasi Wiredu, “Moral foundations of an African
culture,” Person and Community: Ghanaian Philosophical Studies, ed. Kwasi Wiredu and Kwame
Gyekye (Washington, D.C.: Council for Research in Values and Philosophy, 1992), pp. 193–206 at p.
204; and for another example among the Tiv in Nigeria, see Richard Miller, Moral Differences
(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1992), pp. 21–8.
10On which see Tutu, No Future Without Forgiveness.
11Constitutional Court of South Africa, The State vs T Makwanyane and M Mchunu Case CCT
3/94 (1995).
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in order to make a profit in light of demand nor simply to care for one’s immediate
family.12 The “empire building” of a Warren Buffet is anathema here, where the
pointofworkshouldnotbetoamasswealthforoneselforfor itsownsake,butrather
to benefit others. That is one reason why so many African societies adopted
(quasi-)socialist economic systems after independence in the post-war era; free
markets seemed, if not inherentlywrong, then at least something thatwould hinder
morally desirable behaviour. And one continues to find contemporary African
thinkers railing against Western “brash competitiveness,”13 “single-minded
commercialism,”14 “unbridled individualism,”15 and “morally blind, purely
economic logic,”16 instead tending to favour certain kinds of cooperatives.
J. to distribute wealth largely on the basis of individual rights, as opposed to
need.
The requirements of an individual to help others are typically deemed heavier
in African morality than in Western. People in the West tend to think that
individual rights should largely determine the resources one may possess, for
example, one has a right to keep what one deserves for having been productive,
a right to shares in virtue of having contributed to a cooperative scheme, or a
right to keep what one has received by voluntary transfer from a previous owner.
Giving to others what they have no right to is not thought of as upholding a duty
but as being generous. In contrast, a greater percentage of Africans think that one
is morally obligated to help others, roughly to the extent that one can and that
others need, with rights not figuring into the analysis of how much one ought to
transfer wealth, time or labour.17 Illustrative is the parable of the cow (and similar
widespread sayings): “if you have two cows and the milk of the first cow is
sufficient for your own consumption, Ubuntu expects you to donate the milk of
the second cow to your underprivileged brothers and sisters.”18 Conversely, more
12See, e.g., Leo Marquard and T. G. Standing, The Southern Bantu (London: Oxford University
Press, 1939), esp. pp. 20–32; Stanlake Samkange and Tommie Marie Samkange, Hunhuism or
Ubuntuism: A Zimbabwean Indigenous Political Philosophy (Harare: Graham Publishing Company,
1980), esp. pp. 80–7; and Segun Gbadegesin, “Yoruba philosophy: individuality, community, and
moral order,” African Philosophy: An Anthology, ed. Emmanuel Chukwudi Eze, pp. 130–41 at
pp. 132–3.
13Broodryk, Ubuntu, p. 54; cf. pp. 66–7.
14Wiredu, “Moral foundations of an African culture,” p. 202.
15N. K. Dzobo, “Values in a changing society: man, ancestors and God,” Person and Community,
ed. Wiredu and Gyekye, pp. 223–40 at p. 226.
16Godfrey Tangwa, “The HIV/AIDS pandemic, African traditional values and the search for a
vaccine in Africa,” reprinted in Ethics & AIDS in Africa, ed. Anton van Niekerk and Loretta
Kopelman (Claremont: David Philip Publishers, 2005), pp. 179–89 at p. 181.
17For discussion, see Wiredu, “Moral foundations of an African culture,” pp. 198–202; Kwame
Gyekye, “Person and community in African thought,” Person and Community, ed. Wiredu and
Gyekye, pp. 113–21; Ramose, African Philosophy Through Ubuntu, pp. 150–1; and D. A. Masolo,
“Western and African communitarianism: a comparison,” A Companion to African Philosophy, ed.
Wiredu, pp. 483–98 at esp. pp. 488–96.
18Walter Sisulu quoted in Broodryk, Ubuntu, pp. vii; see also pp. 1, 36–9.
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Africans than Westerners think that it is permissible to take goods such as food
without others’ consent, so long as one does not overdo it.19
K. to ignore others and violate communal norms, as opposed to
acknowledging others, upholding tradition and partaking in rituals.
A nice illustration of this point is a study recounted by Augustine Shutte in his
book devoted to ubuntu.20 He notes a survey that was taken of two groups of
nuns at a convent. After the obligatory chores and praying were done, the study
found that the German nuns often continued to work by knitting or sewing,
while the African nuns did not and instead spent time in conversation. The study
noted that each group of sisters deemed the other morally lacking; the Germans
judged the Africans insufficiently diligent, while the Africans considered the
Germans to objectionably care more about practical matters than about people.
More generally, it is common among Africans, and more so than among
Westerners, to think that one has some moral obligation to engage with one’s
fellows and to support the community’s way of life.21 This does not mean that
African values forbid individuality, creativity or nonconformity, but it does mean
that some weight in moral thinking is given to whether behaviour upsets
communal norms.22
L. to fail to marry and procreate, as opposed to creating a family.
Many African people think there is some strong moral reason to extend
familial relationships by finding a (heterosexual) spouse and having children.23
Polygamy is often permitted, and indeed welcomed, because of its effectiveness at
generating more children than monogamy would.24 The point is not merely that,
having wed, one is morally obligated to keep one’s vows, or that, having had
children, one is obligated to ensure they are well cared for; these norms are of
19Tangwa, “The HIV/AIDS pandemic, African traditional values and the search for a vaccine in
Africa,” p. 180; and Heidi Verhoef and Claudine Michel, “Studying morality within the African
context,” Journal of Moral Education, 26 (1997), 389–407 at p. 399. Note that such taking would
not count as “stealing” since the person in possession of the item is presumably not its rightful owner
in light of the other’s need for it.
20Augustine Shutte,Ubuntu: An Ethic for the New South Africa (Cape Town: Cluster Publications,
2001), pp. 27–8.
21John Mbiti, the influential scholar of African thought, makes this point and is approvingly cited
in Dzobo, “Values in a changing society,” p. 229.
22The standard objection to African ethics is that it is overly restrictive of individual liberty,
sometimes called the “dark side” of ubuntu. For discussion, see Dirk Louw, “Ubuntu and the
challenges of multiculturalism in post-apartheid South Africa,” Quest, 15 (2001), 15–36 at esp.
pp. 19–26.
23Dzobo, “Values in a changing society,” pp. 227, 233; Wiredu, “Moral foundations of an African
Culture,” p. 205; Godfrey Tangwa, “Bioethics: an African perspective,” Bioethics, 10 (1996),
183–200 at pp. 194–5; Bénézet Bujo, Foundations of an African Ethic: Beyond the Universal Claims
of Western Morality, trans. Brian McNeil (New York: Crossroad Publishing Company, 2001),
pp. 6–7, 34–54.
24Ramose, “The ethics of ubuntu,” p. 329.
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course quite widespread in Western societies. The point is rather the stronger
claim that one has some obligation to wed and procreate in the first place, a view
that is much less common in the West.
We now have twelve firm moral intuitions, six both Western and African and
six more African than Western, by which to evaluate moral theories in the rest of
this article. I seek to discover a principle that both entails and well explains all
twelve. The field is not yet aware of such a principle, and it is my task in the rest
of this article to find one.
More specifically, I make it my task to find a principle that captures all of the
commonsensical moral judgments outlined above and that is fundamentally
secular. There is debate about the respects in which religion and morality relate
to each other in African thinking, with some arguing that religion is foundational
with respect to morality and others denying it.25 Based on my familiarity with
this literature, I think it is clear that at least many African societies are
best interpreted as believing moral norms to be logically independent of
supernaturalist theses. And if I am correct below that reference to supernatural
elements is unnecessary to account well for the twelve intuitions, then this article
may be read as supporting such an interpretation. However, I am not out to
defend an anthropological representation of the nature of African belief systems
here; I instead stipulate that I seek to develop a moral theory that is non-religious
at its base. I do so partly since I favour ethical naturalism on meta-ethical
grounds, and partly since it is a sufficiently large and coherent project to critically
analyze those accounts of ubuntu that make no reference at bottom to, say,
ancestors or God (but that could account for the right way to relate to these
spiritual beings, supposing they exist).
II. UBUNTU AS A MORAL THEORY
In this section, I point out that there are six competing theoretical interpretations
of ubuntu to be found in the literature. I distinguish between them, and argue that
one promises to do much better than the other five at accounting for all twelve of
the intuitions canvassed in the previous section. Here is the first account of
ubuntu as a moral theory:
U1: An action is right just insofar as it respects a person’s dignity; an act is
wrong to the extent that it degrades humanity.
25Some key texts include J. N. Kudadjie, “Does religion determine morality in African societies?”
Religion in a Pluralistic Society, ed. J. S. Pobee (Leiden: E. J. Brill, 1976), pp. 60–77; Wiredu, “Moral
foundations of an African culture”; Kwame Gyekye, An Essay on African Philosophical Thought
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1987); M. Akin Makinde, “African culture and moral
systems,” Second Order, 1 (1988), 1–27; Gbadegesin, “Yoruba philosophy”; and Peter Kasenene,
Religious Ethics in Africa (Kampala: Fountain Publishers, 1998).
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This principled rendition of ubuntu states that there is value intrinsic to
something about human nature that demands honouring. It is inspired by some
remarks of members of the South African Constitutional Court, which has on
occasion appealed to the value of ubuntu when making legal decisions. For
instance, Justice Yvonne Mokgoro remarks: “(H)uman rights derive from the
inherent dignity of the human person. This, in my view, is not different from what
the spirit of ubuntu embraces.”26
One might suspect from the judge’s remarks that her conception of the dignity
of humanity is Kantian, in other words, that she deems what is special about
human beings to be their capacity for free will or reasoned choice. However,
Kantian respect for persons is a classically Western theory that cannot easily
accommodate many of the African but not Western intuitions discussed above. In
particular, if respect for humanity means respect for the capacity for autonomy,
then the theory has difficulty accounting for the moral duties to prize
reconciliation over retribution in criminal justice (H), to uphold tradition and
rituals in civil society (K), or to procreate in the family (L).
Fortunately, there is another way to construe Justice Mokgoro’s remarks
regarding respect for human dignity, namely, in terms of honouring human life.27
Another African thinker, Godfrey Onah, thinks that such a principle grounds
African values:
At the centre of traditional African morality is human life. Africans have a sacred
reverence for life. . . . To protect and nurture their lives, all human beings are
inserted within a given community. . . . The promotion of life is therefore the
determinant principle of African traditional morality and this promotion is
guaranteed only in the community. Living harmoniously within a community is
therefore a moral obligation ordained by God for the promotion of life.28
While this conception of respect for human dignity is more African in flavour
than the Kantian conception, I submit that it also fails to account for several of
the intuitions. If respect means treating human life as the most important intrinsic
value in the world, then it cannot easily account for the wrongness of deceiving
(C) and breaking promises (E), for such actions need not eradicate, impair or
degrade life. In addition, it is unclear how respect for life provides reason to seek
consensus when establishing policy (G) or to cooperate rather than compete
when generating wealth (I).
26Justice Yvonne Mokgoro of the Constitutional Court of South Africa, The State versus T
Makwanyane and MMchunu, para. 309. See also the remarks of Justice Langa in the same case, para.
225.
27She says, “life and dignity are like two sides of the same coin. The concept of ubuntu embodies
them both” (Ibid., para. 311).
28Godfrey Onah, “The meaning of peace in African traditional religion and culture”; available at:
http://www.afrikaworld.net/afrel/goddionah.htm (accessed December 4, 2006). See also Bujo,
Foundations of an African Ethic, esp. pp. 2, 52, 62, 66, 88; and Francis Deng, “Human rights in the
African context,” A Companion to African Philosophy, ed. Wiredu, pp. 499–508.
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In reply, the quotation from Onah suggests that communal harmony will have
the function of protecting life, where lies, distrust, dissensus and competition
would undermine community.29 That might well be true for small-scale societies.
If there were much conflict in them, they would be much less effective at hunting,
farming, rearing children and dealing with aggressive neighbouring groups.
However, that is to posit a merely contingent relationship between the protection
of life, on the one hand, and truth-telling, promise-keeping, consensus-seeking
and cooperating, on the other. In modern societies, for example, life is not
threatened by the occasional or even somewhat common absence of such actions,
and yet many Africans would find them morally appropriate even in such a
context. The principle of respect for life therefore fails to account for a number
of core values associated with ubuntu, leading me to consider another principle.
U2: An action is right just insofar as it promotes the well-being of others; an act
is wrong to the extent that it fails to enhance the welfare of one’s fellows.
As opposed to the respect-based understanding of ubuntu in U1, U2 is a more
utilitarian one. It is a common interpretation in the literature, advocated by the
renowned philosophers from Ghana, Kwasi Wiredu and Kwame Gyekye, both of
whom conceive of African morality as a function of improving people’s quality of
life. Wiredu speaks of “the harmonization of interests as the means, and the
securing of human well being as the end of all moral endeavor,” while Gyekye
mentions that “norms, ideals, and moral virtues can be said to include generosity,
kindness, compassion, benevolence, respect, and concern for others; in fine, any
action or behavior that conduces to the promotion of the welfare of others.”30
The problem facing this construal of ubuntu is the problem facing any
utilitarianism: an exclusively consequentialist focus on human well-being has
notorious difficulties grounding constraints, for example, against stealing (D) or
discriminating (F) as means to the greater good. To avoid this problem, consider
a theory that includes such constraints at a fundamental level.
U3: An action is right just insofar as it promotes the well-being of others
without violating their rights; an act is wrong to the extent that it either
violates rights or fails to enhance the welfare of one’s fellows without
violating rights.
Gyekye advocates this view, which he calls “moderate communitarianism,” when
he says, “Even though in its basic thrust and concerns it gives prominence to
duties toward the community and its members, it does not—cannot—do so to the
29Cf. Bujo, Foundations of an African Ethic, p. 88.
30Kwasi Wiredu, “Custom and morality: a comparative analysis of some African and western
conceptions of morals,” Cultural Universals and Particulars, pp. 61–77 at p. 65; Gyekye, “Person and
community in African thought,” p. 109. For other largely welfarist interpretations of African
morality, see Tangwa, “Bioethics,” at esp. pp. 189, 192; Polycarp Ikuenobe, “Moral education and
moral reasoning in traditional African cultures,” The Journal of Value Inquiry, 32 (1998), 25–42; and
Bewaji, “Ethics and morality in Yoruba culture.”
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detriment of individual rights whose existence and value it recognizes, or should
recognize.”31 Different interpretations of the view will have different accounts of
the relevant rights and of what counts as their violation.
We need not specify which rights there are and what it is to violate them, in
order to know that this theory has difficulty accounting for all the intuitions at
stake. In particular, consensus (G), cooperation (I), and tradition (K), which are
pro tanto morally desirable from many an African perspective, can be inefficient
as ways to promote human welfare. Much social science indicates that people’s
quality of life—whether understood in terms of pleasurable experiences, satisfied
desires, met needs or objective functionings—is raised most effectively with
majoritarianism in politics, labour- and consumer-markets in economics, and
innovative and unconventional behaviour in civil society. Let us therefore
consider a conception of the good other than well-being, which the next theory
offers.
U4: An action is right just insofar as it positively relates to others and thereby
realizes oneself; an act is wrong to the extent that it does not perfect one’s
valuable nature as a social being.
This is probably the dominant interpretation of African ethics in the literature.32
Many thinkers take the maxim “a person is a person through other persons” to
be a call for an agent to develop her personhood. Shutte, whose book I mentioned
above, captures ubuntu this way:
(T)he moral life is seen as a process of personal growth. . . . Our deepest moral
obligation is to become more fully human. And this means entering more and more
deeply into community with others. So although the goal is personal fulfilment,
selfishness is excluded.33
And Mogobe Ramose, author of another useful book on ubuntu, says that “to be
a human be-ing is to affirm one’s humanity by recognising the humanity of others
and, on that basis, establish humane relations with them. . . . One is enjoined,
yes, commanded as it were, to actually become a human being.”34 Instead of
others’ welfare being the relevant good for a moral agent to promote, here it is the
realization of one’s distinctively human and valuable nature, specifically, one’s
special ability to engage in communal relationships. One is reminded of the
young Marx’s views35 and, of course, ultimately of Aristotle’s.
31Gyekye, “Person and community in African thought,” p. 121.
32In addition to quotations in the text from Shutte and Ramose, see Gyekye, An Essay on African
Philosophical Thought, pp. 156–57; Mokgoro, “Ubuntu and the law in South Africa,” p. 3; Drucilla
Cornell and Karin van Marle, “Exploring ubuntu: tentative reflections,” African Human Rights Law
Journal, 5 (2005), 195–220 at p. 206; and perhaps Bujo, Foundations of an African Ethic, pp. 87–94.
33Shutte, Ubuntu, p. 30.
34Ramose, African Philosophy Through Ubuntu, p. 52.
35See especially the infrequently read fragment, “On James Mill,” Karl Marx: Selected Writings,
ed. David McLellan (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1977), pp. 114–22.
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This theory will vary depending on how our social nature or capacity for
community gets cashed out. As with the previous theory, however, we do not
need to specify the present one in order to become aware of serious problems. I
submit that its fundamental emphasis on self-realization has counter-intuitive
implications. Suppose that you need a new kidney to survive and that no one will
give one to you. Then, to maximize your self-realization, you would need to kill
another innocent person so as to acquire his organs. Of course, in killing you
would not be realizing yourself, for the theory says that to realize yourself you
must do so by positively supporting other persons in some way. However, since
you can positively support other persons in the long-term only by remaining
alive, which in this case requires killing another person, the theory
counter-intuitively seems to permit murder for one’s own benefit (A).
A straightforward way to resolve this problem would be to build constraints
into the theory, so that an act is right if and only if it develops one’s social
nature without violating the rights of others. That manoeuvre avoids the
counterexample. However, this version of the self-realization theory still faces the
problem that it can never permit, let alone require, giving up one’s life for others
(J), even for one’s children,36 since one’s self-realization would thereby end.37 At
this point, the friend of ubuntu qua self-realization must argue that sacrificing
one’s life for another person would be such a high “spike” in the expression of
one’s communal nature that one could not express more of it if one were instead
to stay alive.38
One can obviously question whether killing oneself when necessary to help
others is invariably a way to maximize the realization of one’s communal nature.
However, I shall grant the claim, which, if true, probably enables the present
theory to entail all the intuitions I have laid out. I now question the theory’s
ability to provide an attractive explanation of them. If I ask why I should help
others, for example, this theory says that the basic justificatory reason to do so
(though not my proper motive for doing so) is that it will help me by making me
more of a mensch or a better person. However, a better fundamental explanation
of why I ought to help others appeals not to the fact that it would be good for me,
or at least not merely to this fact, but to the fact that it would (likely) be good for
them, an explanation that a self-realization ethic by definition cannot invoke.
Note that one can agree that acting for the sake of others is either constitutive of,
or a means to, one’s own good without holding, as per the present theory, that it
is one’s own good that has fundamental moral worth.
36Consider Tangwa’s remark about his people from Cameroon: “Every Nso’ person would prefer
his/her own death to that of his/her child” (Tangwa, “Bioethics,” p. 194).
37Assuming, as I do, a naturalist interpretation of the self-realization theory, something neither
Shutte nor Ramose does.
38This is the way that Aristotle deals with the problem, according to Erik Wielenberg, “Egoism and
eudaimonia-maximization in the Nicomachean Ethics,” Oxford Studies in Ancient Philosophy, 26
(2004), 277–95.
332 THADDEUS METZ
Before turning to the remaining two accounts of ubuntu as a moral theory,
notice that the above four ground morality in something internal to the
individual, whether it be her life (U1), well-being (U2), rights (U3), or
self-realization (U4). A different understanding of the morality of ubuntu
includes the idea that moral value fundamentally lies not in the individual, but
rather in a relationship between individuals. The distinction here is analogous to
that between individualism and holism in environmental ethics. One might
morally value something about animals as they are in isolation (capacity for
pleasure, subject of a life), on the one hand, or as being members of certain
groups (species, ecosystems), on the other. Similarly, one might morally value
something about people as they are in themselves or as being part of certain
relationships. The idea that interpersonal relationships of some kinds have basic
moral status is not often found in Anglo-American or Continental normative
theory,39 but it is well worth considering. It is a banality to say that dominant
Western moral views are “individualistic” and African ones are
“communitarian,” and so it is odd that the most common theoretical
interpretations of ubuntu, which I have explored above, are all more the former
than the latter. Let us now consider some properly communitarian renditions of
ubuntu.
U5: An action is right just insofar as it is in solidarity with groups whose
survival is threatened; an act is wrong to the extent that it fails to support
a vulnerable community.
One of the first and most cited books on ubuntu advocates this understanding
of the basic idea. Its authors say, “Ubuntu is . . . a concept of brotherhood
and collective unity for survival among the poor in every society” and
“Disadvantaged groups anywhere in the world survive through collective
consciousness and collective unity on all survival issues such as liberation, rent
boycotts, strikes and mass actions. The authors of this book refer to this as the
solidarity principle or ubuntu.”40
This understanding of ubuntu is obviously too narrow to be an acceptable
moral theory. For one, it prescribes actions only to certain agents, the destitute,
and not to others. And even if it were broadened to include all agents (which U5
does), it would still be too limited for ascribing the single end of survival, or,
again more broadly, flourishing. Surely not every right action is one likely to
realize the end of improving the lot of the worst-off. For instance, keeping one’s
promises (E), seeking consensus in political choice (G), engaging in communal
rituals (K), and raising a family (L) are, for many sub-Saharan Africans, morally
39The closest one gets is the ethic of care and certain strains of communitarianism, far from
dominant views these days. See below for a brief contrast between the favoured conception of ubuntu
as a moral theory and these Western views.
40Lovemore Mbigi and Jenny Maree, Ubuntu: The Spirit of African Transformation Management
(Randburg: Knowledge Resources, 1995), pp. 1, 58.
TOWARD AN AFRICAN MORAL THEORY 333
commendable even when they lack the function of fighting poverty. What is
needed is a broader notion of the sort of relationships that morally matter.
U6: An action is right just insofar as it produces harmony and reduces discord;
an act is wrong to the extent that it fails to develop community.
This, I submit, is the most promising theoretical formulation of an African ethic
to be found in the literature. Tutu expresses it in the following characterization
of ubuntu:
Harmony, friendliness, community are great goods. Social harmony is for us the
summum bonum—the greatest good. Anything that subverts or undermines this
sought-after good is to be avoided like the plague. Anger, resentment, lust for
revenge, even success through aggressive competitiveness, are corrosive of this
good.41
As opposed to well-being or self-realization, this account of ubuntu posits certain
relationships as constitutive of the good that a moral agent ought to promote.
“What is right is what connects people together; what separates people is
wrong.”42
This account of ubuntu has the potential to account for all the intuitions
addressed here, but not particularly well as it stands, for it is too vague. There
are many respects in which the fundamental requirement to promote harmony
and to prevent discord could use clarification and specification, a number of
which I discuss in the conclusion. I have the space in the body of this article
to address only one, crucial way in which the norm is imprecise, namely, the
issue of what constitutes harmony or togetherness. “Harmony” does not refer
to any musical output, and “connecting people together” does not denote
putting everyone in linked chains. In the following section, I seek to make the
metaphors less metaphorical. After doing so, I return to the intuitions and
illustrate how well this theory does at accounting for them, at least relative to
the rivals rejected above.
III. DEVELOPING THE FAVOURED ACCOUNT
In this section, I aim to answer the question of what harmony or togetherness is,
so that the prescription to promote it is better understood. Again drawing on the
literature on African ethics, I note that there are three analytically distinct ways
41Tutu, No Future Without Forgiveness, p. 35.
42Verhoef and Michel, referring to the work of John Mbiti, in “Studying morality within the
African context,” p. 397. Commenting on the practices of the G/wi people of Botswana, George
Silberbauer says, “(T)here was another value being pursued, namely the establishing and maintaining
of harmonious relationships. Again and again in discussion and in general conversation this stood out
as a desired and enjoyed end in itself, often as the ultimate rationale for action.” See his “Ethics in
Small-Scale Societies,” A Companion to Ethics, ed. Peter Singer (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1991),
pp. 14–28.
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it has been or reasonably could be understood. One understanding, I argue, is
prima faciemore attractive than the other two, and enables the theory inspired by
Tutu’s remarks to account for commonsensical moral judgments.
H1: Shared Identity.
One thing “harmony” and “togetherness” might essentially involve is a common
sense of self, which includes at least the following distinct conditions.43 First, a
given individual conceives of herself as part of a group. You refer to yourself in
the first person plural, including yourself in a “we.”
Second, the group that you consider yourself a member of also considers you
to be a member of it. So, others in the “we” you refer to also include you in their
“we.” You can hardly claim to share identity with the Zulu people merely on the
basis of saying things like, “We Zulus need to stick together.” Self-described
Zulus must also consider you Zulu.
Third, people share identity when they have common ends, if not also the same
motives or reasons that underlie them. It is logically possible to be part of a group
that does not do anything, but the relevant sort of group under consideration
here is one that has some projects.
Fourth and finally, shared identity consists of people in the group coordinating
their activities in order to realize their ends, even if they do not use the same
means or make the same amount of effort.
Families, clubs, churches, schools, firms and nations are instances of shared
identity. The greater the common sense of self: the more people think of
themselves in terms of their group membership; the more ends they share; the
higher they rank these ends; the more they share the same reasons for adopting
these ends; and the more they will sacrifice to achieve these ends. The opposite of
shared identity is division, a matter of defining oneself in opposition to others,
others defining themselves in opposition to one, and one adopting ends that
conflict with those of others. Enemies on a battlefield are clearly divided in this
way.44
While a shared identity might ground some duties of loyalty, it is hard to see
how it could be very morally important in itself. After all, members of the former
South African Nationalist Party that enforced apartheid had a common sense of
self. One surely has no duty to promote such a group if one is not a member. And
if one is a member, though one might owe some fidelity to other members, there
is in all likelihood a much stronger duty to try to dissolve the group (and not
43This interpretation of harmony is inspired by some of Gyekye’s remarks about what counts as
a community in “Person and community in African thought,” p. 320.
44Are competitive sports teams also divided? Teams are usually part of an umbrella association
(e.g., FIFA) and they coordinate their activity to realize the common ends of entertaining the public
or demonstrating skill, which would arguably put them on the “shared identity” side of things. Even
so, I accept that the present account of harmony and discord is open to more tightening.
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merely because the group fails to promote the shared identity of others outside
the group). Therefore, let us consider a different sort of harmony, one more worth
promoting from a moral point of view.
H2: Good-Will.
Another thing that “harmony” might mean is a certain caring or supportive
relationship.45 One has a relationship of good-will insofar as one: wishes another
person well (conation); believes that another person is worthy of help (cognition);
aims to help another person (intention); acts so as to help another person
(volition); acts for the other’s sake (motivation); and, finally, feels good upon the
knowledge that another person has benefited and feels bad upon learning she has
been harmed (affection). In the model case, there are certain causal relationships
that obtain among these pro-attitudes, for example, the intention is partially
responsible for bringing about the volition.
Examples of good-will include nursing, teaching and charity work. The greater
the good-will, the stronger the desire that others benefit, the firmer the belief they
are worthy of it, the higher the ranking of one’s end of helping others, the larger
the sacrifice on others’ behalf, and the greater the empathy with their flourishing
or injury. The opposite, ill-will, would consist of outright sadism and
Schadenfreude.
Good-will and shared identity are logically distinct types of relationship. First
off, there are cases of shared identity without good-will. Think about the
relationship between management and workers in a firm. There is little or no
good-will there—workers don’t typically work for the sake of management, after
all—but both sides would readily think of themselves as part of a larger group
that is involved in joint projects (“We’re MTN”).
Conversely, there can be cases of good-will without shared identity. For a
fantastic case, think about two people who do not know each other, who are in
different rooms and who are unable to communicate. When person A presses a
button in his room, he thereby benefits person B (perhaps B is brought a tasty
meal or learns that money has been deposited into his bank account), and,
likewise, when B presses his button, A benefits. Imagine that A learns of the
beneficial effects on B, but that B does not know they come from A; and suppose
B knows how his button pressing affects A, but A does not know that B is
responsible for his good fortune. Finally, imagine both parties press their buttons
repeatedly. This case is an instance of solidarity without identity, of anonymous
do-gooding. We imagine that the parties care for each other, but that the parties
neither think of themselves as a “we” nor coordinate their behaviour to achieve
common ends.
45This understanding of community comes to mind from Wiredu’s discussion of the “empathetic
harmonization of human interests” (“Custom and morality,” p. 64), which, contra Tutu, he does not
take to have final moral value.
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Good-will without shared identity has more moral value on the face of it than
does shared identity without good-will. If we had to choose between promoting
relationships of solidarity or identity, solidarity would usually win. However, we
often need not choose between them, and the most attractive sort of harmonious
relationship to promote is surely one that includes both.
H3: The Combination of Shared Identity and Good-Will.
While good-will without shared identity is morally more valuable than the
converse, it is better still with shared identity. A condition in which individuals
anonymously help each other is less desirable than mutually recognizing members
of a group who care for one another. Such a communal relationship is perhaps
what Mokgoro has in mind when she says of ubuntu that “harmony is achieved
through close and sympathetic social relations within the group”46 and when
Segun Gbadegesin says, “Every member is expected to consider him/herself an
integral part of the whole and to play an appropriate role towards achieving the
good of all.”47 To be close or part of the whole is reasonably understood as
sharing an identity, whereas to be sympathetic or realize the well-being of others
is to have good-will. The combination of the two conditions is what I deem to be
the most attractive conception of harmony–or a broad sense of “love.” A loving
relationship is a prima facie attractive moral value and is the good that, I show
below, best accounts for the relatively uncontroversial intuitions.
Analogies are often drawn between the sort of society many Africans value and
an extended family. Now, the attractive sort of family is one in which people are
loving, that is, they have a common sense of self and act for one another’s sake.
Conceiving of harmony in terms of love thereforemakes good sense of the analogy.
In addition, although the requirement to promote harmony has a basic teleological
structure that is familiar inWestern ethics, its holistic conception of the good to be
promoted differs from what is predominant there, typically either pleasure,
preference satisfaction, need fulfilment, autonomy or self-development. As noted
above, African thought is often characterized as “communitarian,” which the
present theory captures markedly better than its rivals. Placing basic moral status
in a loving relationship between people is more holistic than putting it in an
individual’s life (U1), well-being (U2), rights (U3), or self-realization (U4), even if
these latter views entail that individuals ought to sacrifice much for the sake of
others. Note that the moral injunction to produce harmony qua the combination
of identity and solidarity is relational in a way that differs from themost influential
forms of holism in contemporary Western ethics. It is less relativist than, say,
the views of those communitarians who think that the norms of a particular
46Mokgoro, “Ubuntu and the law in South Africa,” p. 3.
47Gbadegesin, “Yoruba philosophy,” p. 131.
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community arebindingon thosewhoareborn into it,48 and it ismore impartial than
the views of certain care ethicists who believe that one’s extant relationships alone
have moral status.49
I am now in a position to enrich U6, the terse statement that directs agents to
produce harmony: An action is right just insofar as it promotes shared identity
among people grounded on good-will; an act is wrong to the extent that it fails
to do so and tends to encourage the opposites of division and ill-will. While this
principle still needs clarification and refinement in many respects, which I take up
in section IV, it is less vague and metaphorical than the initial statement.
Furthermore, I submit that it is intelligible enough to see that, of the six
theoretical accounts of ubuntu discussed in section II, this one best accounts for
the twelve intuitions from section I.
Recall that both Westerners and friends of ubuntu equally hold the following
to be wrong: (roughly) killing, raping, lying, stealing, breaking promises and
discriminating. On the face of it, these are rather unloving actions. More
specifically, these actions do not involve shared identity; they include neither
activity coordinated to realize shared ends nor any “we-ness.” Furthermore, the
actions do not involve good-will, for they tend to reduce people’s quality of life
and are far from a matter of acting for the sake of others.
Of course, there will conceivably be instances in which one of these discordant
actions performed in the short-term could produce a greater harmony in the
long-term, and the goal-based nature of the present account of ubuntu, as it
stands, would seem to recommend so acting. I do think this theory needs
deontological restrictions built into it.50 The theoretically neatest way to do so
would be to forbid promoting identity and solidarity by means of a substantial
degree of their opposites of division and ill-will, a more elegant solution than
Gyekye’s ad hoc combination of rights and utility (U3). I do not have the space
here to flesh out this proposal and to ascertain whether it captures all firm
intuitions about the aptness of constraints.51 I merely note that, unlike the other
five theories, the present one—at least with restrictions of some kind—best
accounts for the intuitions more or less equally shared by Africans and
Westerners. For instance, it oddly entails neither that deception has no pro tanto
moral wrongness when it does not degrade life (U1), nor that racial discrimination
is a permissible means to producing happiness (U2), nor that killing others is
48See, e.g., Michael Sandel’s notion of “encumbered selves” in Liberalism and the Limits of Justice
(New York: Cambridge University Press, 1982).
49For instance, Nel Noddings thinks that there is “no command to love” and hence no duty to aid
strangers since one lacks any caring relationship with them. See Caring: A Feminine Approach to
Ethics and Moral Education (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1984).
50As does Tutu, or one of his intellectual biographers. See Michael Battle, Reconciliation: The
Ubuntu Theology of Desmond Tutu (Cleveland: Pilgrim Press, 1997), p. 52.
51I begin this work in Thaddeus Metz, “Developing an African moral theory: a new account of
human rights” (unpublished).
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permissible ifnecessary to survive (U4), nor that promise-breaking is permissible
if it does not affect the worst-off (U5).
Now recall that many friends of ubuntu, but comparatively fewer Westerners,
uncontroversially find the following to be morally impermissible to some degree:
decision-making in the face of dissensus, primarily retributive punishment,
intensely competitive economics, a rights-based allocation of wealth, isolation
from a community’s way of life, and failure to procreate through marriage. Let
us consider how my interpretation of Tutu’s injunction to produce harmony and
reduce discord accounts for these judgments.
First off, in the political realm, the most intense sort of shared identity would
be one in which all people have come to an agreement—have become of one
mind—about major laws. Not only is unanimous decision-making constitutive of
shared identity, it is likely to promote both shared identity and good-will in the
long run more than majoritarianism since the minority would feel less excluded
from the political process.52 And when it comes to dealing with those who have
broken laws, the outcome-based nature of ubuntu cannot ground a retributive
theory of punishment, which takes the proper amount of punishment to be fixed
by past facts about the crime. To punish merely because a wrong was done and
in proportion to it is by definition not to punish in order to promote the end of
good-will, let alone shared identity.
In the economic arena, to compete with fellow citizens on labour and
consumer markets with an eye to maximizing self-interest is of course not to act
for the sake of others, and hence is not an instance of good-will. That is so, even
if invisible hand effects turn out to be indirectly beneficial for society. Ubuntu so
understood also clearly rules out miserliness when it comes to distributing
wealth; its good-will element prescribes generosity, forbidding a stingy reference
to individual rights to keep goods regardless of whether they are unneeded by the
possessor and others need them.
Finally, the shared identity condition of harmony naturally accounts for
the remaining intuitions regarding the private lifeworld of culture and family.
Upholding traditions and participating in rituals is one important way to identify
with others, in other words, to think of oneself as a member of a group and to
engage in joint projects. And creating new human beings enables one to expand
the range of a common sense of self, to enlarge the scope of a “we.”
In sum, upon understanding the prescription to produce harmony in terms of
the requirement to promote identity and solidarity, or a broad sense of “love,”
accounting for our twelve intuitions is a fairly straightforward matter. Before
concluding, I provide very brief comparisons between my interpretation of Tutu’s
ubuntuist theory and its rivals, with an eye to suggesting reasons why people
might have gone astray in finding the rivals attractive. They all have a kernel of
52As Wiredu argues in Cultural Universals and Particulars, pt. 4.
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truth that U6 arguably best captures while avoiding their problems. Consider,
first, the view that ubuntu is fundamentally a matter of reverence for human life
(U1). Valuing human life, or thinking of others as worthy of flourishing, is of
course part of loving others or promoting harmony, but does not exhaust it, while
the broader value is needed to account for a much larger array of duties. Next,
think about ubuntu in its welfarist interpretation (U2 and U3). Harmony, which
includes good-will, often ends up realizing well-being, but, on my interpretation
of ubuntu, well-being is not the ground of moral rightness; instead, caring
relationships that tend to produce well-being (but that might ultimately fail to do
so) have basic moral status. Now recall the common idea that ubuntu prescribes
self-realization through communal relationships (U4). What is largely doing
the work in this view, I submit, is not the focus on self-realization, but rather
the communal relationships. Focusing on relationships, as opposed to self-
development, presents an interesting contrast to what is dominant in Western
ethics and in any event better coheres with firm moral judgments about when,
how and why to help others. Lastly, the idea of solidarity with groups whose
survival is threatened is morally important (U5), but is surely not the whole story
about right action. Helping to protect the lives or ways of life of vulnerable
populations is one way to promote shared identity and good-will, but it is not the
only way.
IV. CONCLUSION: TOPICS FOR FUTURE WORK
In sum, the most justified normative theory of right action that has an African
pedigree is the requirement to produce harmony and to reduce discord, where
harmony is a matter of identity and solidarity. I am aware that this theory is still
incomplete and imprecise in many ways. I conclude by listing some questions that
one can fairly pose with respect to refining it, questions that need to be addressed
elsewhere.
Must harmony be realized in order to do right? Suppose one performs an act
that one reasonably expects will promote harmony but that happens not to. Has
one acted rightly? Or suppose that one acts in a way likely to produce discord,
but luckily it does not. Has one acted wrongly?53
Must one always be part of the harmony promoted? Suppose one faces a
choice of promoting a certain amount of shared identity and solidarity between
oneself and others, on the one hand, or promoting a greater amount between
others in one’s society (excluding oneself), on the other. What is the morally right
53According to John Mbiti’s classic study of African worldviews, “It is not the act in itself which
would be ‘wrong’ as such, but the relationships involved in the act: if relationships are not hurt or
damaged, and if there is no discovery of the break of custom or regulation, then the act is not ‘evil’
or ‘wicked’ or ‘bad.’” See his African Religions and Philosophy, 2nd edn (Oxford: Heinemann
Educational Books, 1989), p. 208.
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thing to do? Roughly, must one be as loving as possible in the long run, or must
one instead be maximally producing of love in the long-term?
May one ever promote harmony globally at the expense of the local? A large
majority of writers on African ethics believe that, in general, “charity begins at
home,” but what is the morally best understanding of “home”: lineage, family,
existing harmonious relationships, spatial proximity or something else? And
suppose one has a choice of promoting a certain degree of harmony among
insiders (family, clan) or a greater degree of it among outsiders. Precisely where
should one promote community, when one cannot promote it equally
everywhere?
Is it even feasible to think of harmony at a global level? Is love necessarily
partial? Or can and should one share identity with, and exhibit good-will toward,
human beings in general?54
What, if any, constraints are there on the way one may promote harmony?
Suppose one can create harmony in the long-term only by creating some lesser
amount of discord in the short-term. What is the right thing to do? Are there
intuitively objectionable means of promoting the end of harmony that would not
involve any discord at all?
After answering these questions, one could provide a complete statement of
ubuntu as a theory of right action. Until then, it would be difficult and perhaps
somewhat unfair to compare the theory to long-standing Western theories. I
nevertheless hope this article has convinced the reader that the most promising
way to construct a competitive African moral theory is to develop Tutu’s
understanding of ubuntu in terms of a basic obligation to promote harmonious
relationships and to prevent discordant ones. Even without further development,
the theory developed here is more African, precise and complete than its rivals in
the literature.
54As Tutu clearly thinks is warranted in No Future Without Forgiveness, pp. 212–13.
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